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AUGUST 2019

POLICY BRIEF
Rent Control—Is the Cure Worse
Than the Disease?
Brian J. Asquith
BRIEF HIGHLIGHTS
n Rent control is common in coastal
cities, but can take many complex
forms.
n Evictions from rent-controlled
apartments tend to rise in booms
and fall in busts.
n Research shows that rent control
incentivizes landlords to at least
temporarily withdraw housing in
response to price increases—the
opposite of what policymakers intend.
n Rent control is unlikely to be a
standalone solution to the underlying
problem plaguing expensive cities:
chronic undersupply of housing.

A
fter a long period of neglect, a new generation of policymakers and activists has
embraced rent control as a solution to the housing affordability crisis plaguing America’s
booming coastal cities. The national median rent for a one-bedroom apartment is $1,209
a month, but for some metro areas it is considerably higher. Urban residents suffering
from the highest rents are mostly in wealthy, coastal cities, such as San Francisco
($3,500), New York City ($2,860), San Jose ($2,480), Los Angeles ($2,360), Oakland
($2,100), and Washington, D.C. ($2,160). In addition to sharing astronomically high
rents, these cities also share another feature: rent control.
Rent-control regimes have operated in these six cities for the better part of 30 years,
and they exist also in a host of smaller cities, chiefly in California, Maryland, and
New Jersey. Undergraduate Economics 101 would have you think that rent control
is essentially a rent freeze, but the reality is that rent control as practiced today has
evolved into a far more complex system. The vast majority of today’s rent controls were
instituted in the 1970s and early 1980s in response to the stagflation crisis, and are often
referred to as rent stabilization, tenancy rent control, or second-generation rent control
to distinguish themselves from their much-maligned predecessor. Since these modern
forms are really the only game in town, I refer to them herein as just rent control.
Policymakers claim that rent control can allow low- to moderate-wage workers to
live close to jobs in expensive cities. They also claim that these rent-control policies
would prevent families from being displaced by high rents into substandard housing.
Even for families who stayed, the rent controls would mean that they could more easily
afford other necessities, like food and health care. This concern applies particularly to
low-income or fixed-income households, such as the elderly and disabled. For example,
Oakland’s rent control ordinance claims to address a “severe housing affordability
crisis,” in which “60 percent of . . . residents are renters, who would not be able to locate
affordable housing within the city if displaced.”
The regimes share four prominent features:
1) The city grants landlords and tenants some freedom to negotiate a starting rent,
and then caps subsequent rent increases according to agency decree or prescribed
formula. This process, called vacancy decontrol, ranges from restrained in New York
City and Washington, D.C., to completely unrestricted in California.

For additional details, see the working paper,
“Do Rent Increases Reduce the Housing
Supply under Rent Control? Evidence from
Evictions in San Francisco,” published by the
Upjohn Institute. https://doi.org/10.17848/
wp19-296.

2) There is automatic lease renewal for existing tenants, and landlords usually require
“just-cause” to evict a tenant. In practice, this means that landlords must prove to a
rent board or court that tenants are being evicted for one of a predetermined list of
reasons. This prevents landlords from turning over tenants at will and locking in new
base rents in response to market shifts.
3) New buildings are exempt from rent control unless the landlord opts in. Policymakers
fear discouraging new supply, so the rules control only existing buildings and commit
to not extending controls further.
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4) There are a series of landlord hardship provisions, where landlords may petition to
pass certain operating expenses on to tenants in order to cover costs with reasonable
profit.
Table 1 shows how the details vary across cities, but it also underscores how these
systems share more policy similarities than differences.
These measures were largely intended to be temporary, but like many so-called
temporary regimes, rent control is the answer to an emergency situation that never
seems to end. One reason for rent control’s persistence is that it redistributes benefits
from future tenants to present ones. One influential study found that, after rent control
was expanded to a new set of apartments in 1994 in San Francisco, tenants in affected
buildings were 10–20 percent more likely to remain at their 1994 address compared
to tenants in the control group. Since rent increases are capped at less than the rate of
inflation, these tenants were (and in some cases still are) effectively being subsidized
to live in their controlled apartments for as long as they like. This creates a powerful
pro-rent-control constituency that can be difficult for reform-minded policymakers to
overcome.
This de facto subsidy to stay in place affects tenants’ labor market outcomes. One
study shows that tenants absorb longer commutes instead of yielding their rentcontrolled apartments, suggesting that keeping the subsidized housing is more valuable
to them than moving closer to a new job or switching job markets altogether. Another
study concluded that the stronger the local rent-control ordinance, the more likely a
person was to limit their job search to local jobs. While rent control may allow workers
to stay close to high-wage jobs in dense urban areas, it is not altogether clear that this is
in the best interests of tenants or the economy in the long run.
Table 1 Major City Rent Control and Evictions Policies, October 2016
City

Subject to
controls if the
building is...

Max annual
allowable rent
increase

Vacancy
decontrol?

Just-cause
evictions?

Rental stock
coverage (%)

Los Angeles

Built before
10/1/1978 and
has 2 or more
units

Regional CPI
rate, bounded
within 3–8%

Yes

Yes

85

Oakland

Built before
1/1/1983 and
has 4 or more
units

Regional CPI
rate, max of
10%

Yes

Yes

66

New York City

Built before
1/1/1974 and
has 6 or more
units

Set by NYC
rent guidelines
board annually

No, rent
increase for
new base rent
capped at 20%a

Yes

47

San José

All rental units
built before
9/7/1979

Previously 8%
6/2016-: 5%

Yes

No, citymandated
arbitration
instead

33

Washington,
DC

An apartment
building
built before
1/1/1976

CPI + 2%, max
of 10%

No, rent
increase for
new base rent
capped at 10%

Yes

66

San Francisco

Built before
6/13/1979 and
has 2 or more
units

60% of CPI,
max of 7%

Yes

Yes

72

a In both cities, landlords can appeal for a rent increase on new base rents of up to 30% if rents in
comparable units are shown to be higher.
NOTE: See Asquith (forthcoming) for detailed sources.
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The evidence suggests
that landlords of rentcontrolled apartments
are less likely to turn over
their tenants when prices
rise.

Rent control’s distortionary effects also extend into housing supply. The policies in
Table 1 collectively dampen landlords’ profits in the controlled market. In the case of San
Francisco, landlords actually lose money since rent increases are capped at 60 percent of
the inflation rate. In growing markets, the gap between what a landlord receives from a
controlled apartment and from one that allows increases at the market rate compounds
over time. Because tenants in this situation have strong incentives to stay longer under
rent control, landlords in turn try to avoid tenants they suspect will be “long-stayers.”
My own research asks: How do landlords of rent-controlled properties change
their housing supply when prices rise? Do they bring more units to market? Or, in San
Francisco, at least, have policymakers imposed such burdens on landlords that they
actually remove properties from the market? To motivate this question, Figure 1 shows
evictions by quarter in San Francisco. The left axis shows Ellis Act evictions, by which
landlords evict all tenants and withdraw an entire building from the market. Ostensibly,
this occurs when landlords no longer want to operate their buildings, and so one might
expect these evictions to rise when the economy slumps and vice versa. Instead, Ellis Act
evictions spike during booms and fall during recessions. The right axis shows “just-cause”
at-fault evictions, mostly tenants being evicted for delinquent rent. Since tenants in the
controlled market are insulated from price increases during booms, one might expect
this type of eviction to rise during recessions as tenants’ ability to pay falls. Instead, like
Ellis Act evictions (albeit less sharply), at-fault evictions seem to rise in boom periods
and level off in recessions.
These relationships suggest that landlords try to evade rent control restrictions
when it would be especially profitable to do so, such as by converting rental units
to condominiums. To test this hypothesis more definitively, I examine how two
outcomes respond to market price increases that affected San Francisco neighborhoods
differentially between 2003 and 2013. The first outcome is whether landlords tactically
evict individual tenants to try to lock in higher rents from new tenants. More specifically,
do landlords use just-cause evictions to expel long-standing but lower-paying tenants? In
spite of the pattern in the graph, I find no statistically significant evidence that landlords
do this. Instead the evidence suggests that landlords of rent-controlled apartments are
less likely to turn over their tenants when prices rise.
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The other outcome is whether controlled landlords outright exit the market in
response to a price increase. I find that landlords do in fact respond to rising prices by
withdrawing from the rental market via Ellis Act evictions (or, in smaller buildings, by
withdrawing one unit from the market by claiming a relative needs to move in). This
is a serious response, because by law the landlords must pay relocation fees and leave
these units vacant (or filled by a family member) for at least three years or be subject to
sanctions.
The two results confirm that the controlled market is distorted compared to “normal”
housing markets. Landlords apparently expect to make such little money on the
controlled market that they conclude it’s better to exit the market entirely, at least for a
few years. If these landlords are thus incentivized to reduce supply as prices rise, it is hard
to see how rent control improves housing market dynamics in these cities.
So, if existing evidence is that rent control is distortionary, why not abolish it? We
have some evidence on what happens when rent control is repealed, and the result is
generally salutary (see, for example, Autor, Palmer, and Pathak 2017). In January 1995,
a Massachusetts law banned rent controls, mostly affecting units in Boston, Cambridge,
and Brookline. Property values in both decontrolled and never-controlled units rose,
while property crime fell, especially in areas with the highest concentration of controlled
units. Additionally, segregation may have decreased.
However, the evidence is not clear on whether low- and middle-income tenants in
fact would have been better off without rent control. So, what are other remedies to help
these groups with housing costs? Government programs have included Section 8 housing
subsidies, low-income housing tax credits to finance new housing, and more recently,
affordable housing mandates. These programs offer some help, particularly to poorer
renters, but generally do little to address the housing needs of middle-income residents
facing excessive rent burdens in expensive cities. Rent control’s lack of means testing is
thus a political strength, because it can claim to be the rare policy that helps middleincome renters as well.
Despite popular demands for government intervention on rents, economists typically
advocate for increasing the housing supply. Frustratingly, there is little empirical evidence
on what happens to rent prices when the number of housing units in a neighborhood
rises, with one study suggesting prices may not move much. Upjohn Institute economist
Evan Mast, Philadelphia Fed economist Davin Reed, and I are currently studying this
issue using data on unit-level migrations, rents, and building openings.
Irrespective of the ultimate answer, rent control is here to stay. The current
beneficiaries are well-organized, numerous, and know what they stand to lose from its
repeal. The return of rent control to the scholarly agenda is thus propitiously timed to
caution policymakers and a frustrated public that while soaring rent burdens are indeed
approaching crisis levels in some places, rent control is a policy that has yet to deliver on
its promise: affordable rents for all, not just for the few lucky enough to score a controlled
apartment.
NOTE
1. Oakland rent control ordinance. https://oakland.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=2680738&GU
ID=BAED7BF3-ED56-4A16-A876-37717D4E01D6&Options=&Search= (accessed January 11, 2019).

Brian J. Asquith is an economist at the Upjohn Institute.
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